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What they did have, did not fit into American manufacturing methods. Our June and July, 1917, investigations in England, France and Italy taught us that, based on the experience of the very best of European manufacturers, delays must be expected before quantity production of satisfactory wartime material could be put into active service on the front. We believed that as soon as America "got going", it could probably manufacture more rapidly than could the European factories. We figured that, even if America did two or three times as good a job as the experienced European were then doing. It would be July 1, 1918 before any quantity of American built aircraft could appear on the western front. With the scarcity of shipping, with the German submarine sinking tonnage so rapidly that the Prime Minister of England thought (in June, 1917) that there was a likelihood of the war being ended in three or four months, there was no telling how much delay there would be in getting our aircraft to Europe even after it was manufactured. It was almost impossible to see where sufficient tonnage could be obtained to transport complete aircraft in great quantities from the United States to Europe.
What is even more important, and what the American public probably has never properly understood, is the fact that we were dependent upon our Allies to keep on fighting and to prevent a German victory while we were getting ready to fight. It would do us no good to build a large Air Force by 1918, even if we could do so, if we deprived the Allies of the necessary raw materials with which to continue fighting. Such an action on our part would tend to terminate the was unsuccessfully before we even got started. From our investigations and experience in England, France and Italy, although we sympathized with America's desire to build a great Air Force and build it quickly, we were convinced that such a force could not begin to appear on the western front before July 1, 1918 at the earliest. If, in the meantime, we did not support the Allies with ample raw materials, they would be defeated before that date.
We were convinced that the greatest and surest contribution the United States could make towards the joint allied air warfare was to render every possible assistance to the Allies in carrying out the aircraft programs of each. Each of our Allies had in the field, large, well organized, well trained, and experienced Air Forces and they planned to greatly augment them during 1918. The American Air Force had yet to be created, yet to be trained, and yet to be organized. Our first duty, undoubtedly, was to successfully support our Allies who were actually carrying on a war until we could get ready to take our part. Therefore, it was essential that our program of production and training should not be 
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