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permitted to interfere in any was with the programs of the Allies and that every productive assistance given to the Allies must take priority over our own needs. Our assistance was vital in three forms:- 1. We must furnish raw and semi-finished material from the United States. 2. It was desirable to develop, as soon as possible, a plan of producing, in great quantity, in the United States, all finished parts for airplanes common to the programs of our allies and of ourselves. Both the Allies and ourselves, in our negotiations, arrived at the conclusion that if this plan could be promptly and effectively established, it would not only do much to relieve the problem of transports by reducing the ocean tonnage required for the transportation of airplane material, but it would so relieve the English, French and Italian factories of primary manufacturing operations as to permit them to increase greatly the output of finished airplanes. 3. We must produce a large quantity of large engines, for, in 1917 and even until the very termination of the war, engine production was the limiting factor in English, French and Italian program. All were unanimous in deciding that, if America could furnish the necessary engines, all the allied countries could increase their output of airplanes. For America to adopt the policy embodied in these three points would be to adopt a self-denying policy, but it was vital that we assist the Allies in every possible way toward the fulfillment of their program in the spring of 1918 even at the sacrifice of our own production programs and policies. It all came down to the fact that the Allies were to continue the war while we were preparing to fight. We must help them to continue it successfully until we could actually take a part in it. Unless we adopted the policy of sacrificing things required for our own production effort in order that the allied production effort might be successful, it was admitted in the summer of 1917 that the Allies could not hope to carry on until American help in the air became effective. It must be remembered that there was a world shortage of vital raw materials for the construction of airplanes. Spruce, linen and dope were outstanding items in this category. However, if American machines could not be counted on prior to July, 1918, what was the American Army on the western front to do for aircraft material? We examined the production resources of England, France and Italy. We found that England with an air program larger then anything theretofore accomplished by her, -21-