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11

ORBITER

PREFLIGHT [[UNDERLINED]]
At the outset of the training cycle, a prime and backup crewperson was assigned to monitor each major flight task and each major Orbiter subsystem. This assignment included procedures development and input to the flight rules and FDF. We feel that this system of assignments worked well. The last 3 days of the flight were planned using the "EZ CAP." In this CAP concept, only the time-critical and trajectory-dependent items were scheduled in two columns: one for Orbiter and one for payload. All non-time-critical items and shopping list items were listed for each day, to be accomplished when expedient. As the CAP matured, the "officer-of-the-deck (OD)" concept was developed to maximize efficiency with the EZ CAP. Each half-day, the CAP was assigned to a crewmember who was responsible for its execution and planning any real-time changes that were necessary. The OD also handled all the communications for his shift. For some portions of the flight, it was inefficient to tie up a crewmember just to handle the communications when the CAP was finalized for the day and other crewmembers were present on the flightdeck. The OD concept, while good in principle, must be used judiciously according to the flight plan tasks. The EZ CAP will be discussed in detail later in this report. 

The crew went through at TCDT prior to both the June launch attempt and the August launch. We are steadfast in our opinion that this test is very beneficial, not only to the flightcrews but also to the launch control team. From the standpoint of the PS, it is invaluable in acquainting him with the launch environment prior to actual flight. We recommend that TCDT's be retained in the KSC flow for each flight. 

The pad abort provided, in a relatively inexpensive way, the impetus to a quantum leap in improvement of pad abort/scrub procedures. That has resulted in a Ground Launch Sequencer (GLS) that is now significantly better at presenting the controllers the required information for an abort/scrub turnaround and, in addition, some features have been automated. The OMI's (S0007) have been rewritten for better clarity and accessibility. The flightcrew now aids in the safing, relieving the closeout crew of having to remain at the launch pad after crew egress. 

The remainifest required a new compilation of the SM major function, which meant that flight software was not avaialble until approximately 1 week prior to flight. The crew had felt it was mandatory to conduct an Interface Verification Test with OV-103 and the cargo with the flight software, as well as an extensive PAM software verification in the SMS. This verification proved to be worth the effort in terms of the crew's confidence in the flight software and hardware. The 41-D crew reiterates the position that flight crew participation in hardware and software checkout is mandatory. 

ASCENT [[UNDERLINED]]
The ascent trajectory was nominal. During first stage, a loud "pop" was heard on the aft flightdeck. The aft ADI panel was later found to be bowed out slightly and is suspected of causing the "pop." An extraneous UHF radio call to "NASA tower" was also heard during the first stage.