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15 lockers for deorbit but, keeping in mind that lockers are accessed continually throughout the flight, this configurations worked well for routine on-orbit ops. Teleprinter Ops. The ground provided the daily updates about 2 hours prior to normal crew wake-up time. Perhaps owning to the general low ambient noise level in OV-103, we found that the teleprinter noise each morning was sufficient to wake the crew. We never mentioned this fact to the ground during the flight, since it was not particularly troublesome. We are aware of the constraints under which the MCC has to operate regarding sites with teleprinter uplink capability, and our only comment is that the ground should continue to strive to send the morning messages as late in the crew sleep cycle as practical. Caution and Warning (underlined). At one point during the afternoon of flight day 4, the crew received a master alarm with neither accompanying CRT message nor light on the F7 matrix. A readout of the 120-light matrix on panel R13 showed only one unusual indication : that of a water loop 1 pump pressure caution and warning limit violation. The indicators were reported the ground, who eventually pit together the scenario. During the time of the master alarm, two crewmembers were filming on the mid deck using the photo floodlights. One of the lights blew an internal fuse as it failed, which spiked AC3. This spike evidently produced the master alarm indication and tripped the water loop parameter which is sensed off AC3. During the sleep period at 10.2 psi, the ground noticed the cabin pressure decaying to near the caution and warning limit. MCC elected to wake the crew with the information to adjust the limit value. As it turned out, it is problematical whether the original limit would have been violated during the sleep period. In general, the crew felt as it was preferable to be awakened and informed of the situation than to have the master alarm awake them. Payload Bay Door Opening DTO (underlined). As on previous first flights of Orbiter vehicles, 41-D had a requirement to perform a modified manual PLBD opening and closing procedure with CCTV documentation. The crew had attempted to prelaunch to understand the intent of the DTO and what had been learned from the CCTV recordings made on previous flights. We specifically inquired as to what part of the door/bulkhead latch roller mechanism was of interest and what television scenes were required. The answer from flight control and flight procedures personnel was that it was largely crew discretion. In fact, the photo/TV checklist included two setups -- one for full zoom-out and one for full zoom-in. During the post flight debriefing, we learned that the E&D sponsors of the DTO were disappointed in the results and apparently had specific items they had wished documented. Of course, this information was never made known to the crew. It is our belief that the crew should not have to seek out the sponsors of DTO's in order to understand what is required. The system needs to accept the responsibility for having the proper procedures in place, or it must be willing to live with the results it gets.