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22
of four at a time. Cassette management was marginal at best, with bags, cassettes, and logging cue cards situated all over the flight deck. In addition, many used cassettes were restowed back in the lockers instead of in the "Return to Houston" stowage bag to avoid overloading it; this process was exceedingly time consuming and frustrating. 

Since VTR recording is fundamental to every activity on every mission, 30-minute cassettes represent inefficient use of both stowage volume and crew time. The current plan to provide an operational VTR with only 1-hour record capability is unsatisfactory. Commercial VTR's are available off-the-shelf with good bandwidth and up to 6-hour record capability; the program office should reconsider their current plans and seriously look into this alternative. 

VTR Audio Record. The OAST-1 payload required audio recording on the video cassettes. Due to a crew procedural error instigated by a hardware compatibility problem, the setup was not performed correctly and all audio was determined post-flight to have been lost. It is possible to connect a headset directly into the audio connector of the VTR, although a headset interfact unit (HIU) is required to be inserted between the headset and the VTR for proper audio recording, even though the VTR audio is always hot mike.  However, the connectors on the HIU and the VTR are both female, so that the two do not mate without an auxiliary male-to-male connector. (Note that this auxiliary connector is not the cable labeled "Audio to VTR," which is a male-to-female cable.)  The fact that the headset connector plugged directly into the VTR misled the crew to believe the setup was proper. Future crews and trainers should be alerted to this trap.

SMS model.  The SMS model of the interactions between Panel A7, the CCTV monitors, the VTR, and the video downlink has been incorrect since OFT.  The situation for 41-D was compounded further, since not only were the standard interfaces not updated properly in the training load, but also the flight-specific requirements were not implemented properly.  Considerable time was wasted in discussions between the crew and the instructor console on how to set up the SMS to look flight-like, a feat which was often unachievable.  Two crewmembers made errors in flight while attempting to record on the VTR which were felt to be directly attributable to the negative training afforded by the SMS model.  In addition, the reliability of the SMS visual scene generator was consistently poor, as it crashed virtually every time the CCTV system was powered up and frequently during use.  It is recommended that the entire CCTV hardware and software model in the SMS be revamped to provide satisfactory training.

FDF
The last 3 days of the flight were planned and flown using the EZ CAP concept, wherein only time-critical and trajectory-dependent items were scheduled in the detailed CAP timeline, while all non-time-critical activities and shopping list items were listed for each day to be accomplished when expedient.  The EZ CAP concept was severely tested when the flight was delayed 2 months because of the pad abort, resulting in a combined payload manifest and a shorter flight.  Although several activities no longer fit into the reduced timeline, the Program Office decided simply to move them to the shopping list rather than delete them from the flight and unstow them from the Orbiter.  Although the activity sponsors and Principal Investigators were informed that their tests and experiments would be performed only if time permitted, they understandably put pressure on the crew (preflight) and the flight directors (during the flight) to accomplish their tests or experiments.