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In light of the circumstances cited above, the actions of the RSO were appropriate and the range safety system destruct of the SRB's did not contribute to the accident (refer to app. A).

5. Findings
a. The prelaunch activities conducted by the operations teams were typical in that some delays and problems were encountered and resolved. The operations team's participation in these activities was straight-forward and had no effect on the accident.

b. The results of the data playbacks on January 29 and 30 confirmed that the STS 51-L ascent flight control team had no indication of an impending catastrophic failure.

c. The STS 51-L flight software performed nominally and was not a contributing factor to the accident.

d. For the mission STS 51-L failure, no survivable abort options were available.

e. The actions of the RSO were appropriate, and the range safety system destruct of the SRB's did not contribute to the accident.

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