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Due to the time constraints on this report, an adequate review of Centaur safety processes was not conducted. Such a review should be conducted in the near future.

7. Operational Maintenance and Inspection

A discussion of the Orbiter maintenance and inspection requirements system is contained in appendix D of this report. Requirements for the operational era started to be introduced into the system in early 1985 but are still not fully defined or implemented. The foundation for the system, the Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD), provides a sound base on which to build a mature system as future requirements are defined.

Some problems have been encountered while progressing toward a mature system. Implementation of newly defined requirements is not always accomplished according to an agreed-upon plan that can be supported by all involved functional areas. Level II also lacks an active closed load audit system to check the quality of compliance with established requirements. Additionally, there is no baseline postflight turnaround schedule to use as a basis for tracking long-term trends in waivers, deferrals, additions, or deletions to the KSC flow. The current informational data base is, however, being upgraded to provide trend analysis and compliance data to managers so that they will have adequate oversight of the system and up-to-date status of the KSC launch site flow.

The NSTS Program Manager has directed the establishment of an Orbiter Maintenance Inspection Program which will involve all Space Shuttle elements including engineering, subsystem management, hardware spares, and Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA). This program is in Phase I which will establish a master plan for government/contractor responsibilities. This plan will provide top management visibility, involvement, direction, and approval. This can serve as a vehicle to correct past deficiencies in the SR&QA area which include insufficient data for adequate oversight by Level II managers and a lack of a centralized data system which keeps managers at all levels and locations properly informed.

8. Findings

1. The currently configured and baselined SMS can support a maximum of 12 to 15 flights per year. This is less than the scheduled 1986 manifest.

2. The current fleet of three STA's can support a maximum of 17 flights per year.

3. Crew workload in the last weeks before flight is high. The problem is aggravated by the late delivery of software or procedures.