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VI. MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS This section contains a collection of the major findings, and conclusions drawn from these findings, as a result of the activities of the Mission Planning and Operations Team (MPOT). These findings and conclusions are presented in summary form in this section. Additional findings and conclusions and supporting data for these findings and conclusions can be found in the appropriate sections and appendices of this report. A. Major Findings 1. STS 51-L manifesting, Mission Operations, flight crew preparations, prelaunch, and launch were typical and satisfatory and had no effect on the accident. 2. There was no action possible that could have resulted in the survival of the STS 51-L crew. 3. The Range Safety System (RSS) did not contribute to the accident. The actions of the Range Safety Officer (RSO) were appropriate. A joint NASA/Department of Defense (DOD) review of the RSS is appropriate and planned. 4. 1985 Mission Operations were successful in spite of significant remanifesting and perturbations. However, the trends indicated that the milestones required to support preparation for the 1986 flight schedule were not being met. 5. The current program commitments preclude devoting adequate resources to developing a capability to support an increased flight rate. 6. The operational Maintenance Inspection Program is immature and does not yet provide Level II with adequate closed loop oversite. It lacks a comprehensive system to track and audit compliance with established requirements. 7. At the time of the STS 51-L launch, KSC landings did not constitute an unreasonable safety of flight risk based on known failures. 8. Statistical weather and forecasting uncertainties have resulted in several weather waveoffs and dictate a need for multiple landing sites for end of mission. 9. The current landing and deceleration systems has not demonstrated an adequate margin for routine KSC and TAL abort operations. 10. The program considered crew escape numerous times but, because of limited utility, technical complexity, cost, schedule, and performance impacts, no systems were implemented. -106-