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and a primary surface width of 1000 feet and a heading of 16/34 were recommended. In February 1972, the siting was approved to be at the current location with a heading change to 15/33. The length was baselined at 15 000 feet with 1500-foot overruns and a width of 200 feet. This plan was presented to JSC and was concurred on by program management and by D. Slayton, Director of Flight Crew Operations. The site selected was chosen as the best over nine other possible sites. The 10-degree heading change avoided Titusville overflights and Patrick Air Force Base (PAFB) traffic interference. The width was expanded to 300 feet the following year after a technical review was completed which considered 20-knot crosswinds. This change was made in consultation with the Air Force concerning large aircraft landings, pilot opinion, and a conservative response to the crosswind analysis that showed that 200 feet width was marginal. The overrun length was reduced to 1000 feet in August 1973 as a result of a technical review which also included the addition of an arresting system at each end of the runway.

In 1973, it was decided to make the runway an all-weather runway by texturing the surface, i.e., adding grooving for water runoff.

The Critical Design Review (CDR) was held in November 1973 and included extensive agency and Air Force participation on the CDR Board. Several items were reviewed and dispositioned. Location of the animal control fence at the edge of the primary surface was approved. The canals, which were to be the source of the soil to be used to build up the runway contour, were raised as a safety hazard. The conclusions and disposition of the Board were that the canals were not a hazard and the water in the canal could serve as an energy absorber. This last item was an engineering judgement and did not represent the results of a study. The review items also included concern over a bird strike hazard and definition of a rollout arresting system. The bird strike hazard was eventually closed by an analysis where Rockwell showed that the Orbiter windows should be able to withstand a 4-pound bird impact at 230 knots. No actual testing has been performed, however. It could be argued that 230 knots is too low a speed, but it is also argued that the time spent in the bird exposure region is very short compared to that of a commercial aircraft and that the Orbiter can be flown from both seats. As far as the bird hazard goes, the greatest safety risk is to the STA which can only be flown from one seat; however, it is capable of taking a 7- to 8-pound bird strike at 295 knots. The arresting system was left as a future definition activity which has remained in limbo until only recently, where action is now underway to develop a net-type arresting system to primarily be used at the short TAL runways and other runways on a runway-by-runway justification basis.

Statistical weather used to determine the runway direction compared favorably with the 33/15 direction, as can be seen when comparing other local runways. It should be noted that the direction is not overwhelmingly favored and that significant Space Shuttle crosswinds can occur in many directions and would underscore a desire for an additional crosswind runway.

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