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---ENDED FOR ALL TIME THE "COMMON BELIEF" THAT FOAM STRIKES ARE ← 
JUST A TURN AROUND ISSUE
---SERVES AS A DRAMATIC STIMULUS TO CHANGE SOME PEOPLES ← 
ATTITUDES ABOUT WHAT WE REALLY "KNOW"
SHEILA:
-FIVE PARALLEL LINES OF WORK:
--AERO [[light circling]]
--THERMO [[light circling]] (THESE TWO REALLY CLOSELY RELATED)
--TIMELINES FROM SENSORS ←
--VIDEO/PHOTO ANALYSIS ←
--DEBRIS RECONSTRUCTION AND FORENSICS ←
-ENTRY DATA DEMONSTRATES THE FLAW WAS PRE-EXISTING
-FLIGHT EVENTS FAIRLY WELL DOCUMENTED, PROGRESSIVE DESTRUCTION CAN BE FAIRLY WELL ESTABLISHED
-HEAT FIRST, AERO FORCES SECOND
-NO POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY

GROUP II
-FOAM AUDIT, DOCUMENTATION OF SCHEDULE PRESSURE AND THE EMAIL STORY OF IMAGERY REQUESTS CAN BE CONSIDERED "DATA"
-ANALYSIS OF HOW HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS HANDLE RISKY ENTERPRISES CREATES A "TEMPLATE" OR A "MENU" FOR US TO USE TO EXAMINE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURE AT THE SSP
-WE USE THE ANALYSIS OF THE "DATA" TO CONCLUDE SSP DOES NOT HAVE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION
-FURTHERMORE, WE REVIEWED HISTORY AND PREVIOUS STUDIES AND DETERMINED NASA DOES NOT LEARN WELL.

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GROUP I:
JB:
-FOUND EVIDENCE IN REAL LIFE THAT SUPPORTS THE ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSE STATEMENT:
--BROKEN SAFETY CULTURE ←
---QUESTIONS REGARDING INDEPENDENCE ←
---ORGANIZATIONAL SHORTFALLS ON CHECKS AND ← 
BALANCES - QAUDRUPLE [[QUADRUPLE]] HATTING ACROSS PROGRAM, CENTER AND HQ
---LACK OF INTEGRATED SAFETY FUNCTIONS ←
---BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION: LACK OF SHUTTLE INTEGRATION; INEFFECTIVE SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DATABASES
---"SILENT SAFETY" SHORTFALLS WITH STS-107: FRR, DAT, MMT AND

TURKEY:
-STUDIED SCORES OF FINDINGS OF OTHER SIGNIFICANCE - HOW TO PREVENT THE NEXT ACCIDENT:
--EXAMPLES: BETTER ENGINEERING DRAWINGS, BETTER SAFETY AND QA, IMPROVED DOCUMENTATION