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PREFACE- SEVERAL POINTS: 

① President was personally moved + involved 

② Commission independent of NASA + reported to president

③ NASA appeared uncoop. in receiving [[m?]] to public, but wasn't to commission

④ Thanked Congress for "being responsible"  

⑤ Range of investigation 
(+ also what it DIDN'T cover) 

⑥ NASA created teams to help → 

[[right margin]] 
doesn't 
∙budget
∙of DL aspects of shuttle 
→ "safety aspects of future flts + lessons learned
[[/right margin]]

- in response to commission
- of people NOT involved in SIL 

INTRO- Quick history of shuttle pgm [[program]]

(inception '69 then 1st 24 flt)

overview of shuttle components (SRS ET ORB) 

overview of typical flt (launch re-entry) 

EVENTS leading up to accident 

crew assignment, TNG 

PL shuffling 

(one issue was schedule pressure on decisions/TNG... flying ~ 1 per month ⇒ system retry stressed)
∙FRR (no mention of SRB U[[?]]NB)
∙Delays, scrubs, Ice team, holds mission (73 sec; PT = no indications to anyone nothing could have been done accident not survivable 

(Al[[?]]l prelude)