Viewing page 101 of 138

This transcription has been completed. Contact us with corrections.

[[right side header]] AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

•Ongoing implementation of independent engineering, safety, and astronaut medical health technical authority (TA), including work by chief engineers, chief safety officers, technical and safety fellows, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC), and the NASA Safety Center (NSC)
•Emergence of more cohesive and cooperative working relationships among Centers

As part of its fact-finding, the ASAP posed a number of key questions to then NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and NASA Associate Administrator (now Acting Administrator) Christopher Scolese. They both responded in candid and thoughtful detail, providing an excellent snapshot of the challenges now confronting NASA. These responses are included as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 at the end of this report.


II. CRITICAL ISSUES
The ASAP recognizes that this is a crucial time for NASA, the new Obama Administration, and the country. Important decisions lie ahead.

A. Proposed Extension of the Space Shuttle Program
To maximize safety, minimize wasted effort, and bolster employee morale, any further debate regarding the future of the Shuttle should be undertaken immediately and completed without further delay. From a safety standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA position on not extending Shuttle operations beyond successful execution of the December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS. Continuing to fly the Shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S. Exploration program by squeezing available resources (and, in the worst case, support) for the Constellation program.

1. Extension of the Space Shuttle Program. Although continuing to fly the Shuttle would minimize the U.S. launch vehicle services gap (currently projected at 5 years) between Shuttle retirement and the beginning of Constellation flights, the ASAP does not favor this approach.

•Shuttle support and manufacturing capabilities are dwindling and possibly not restorable. 
 - The contractor manufacturing base and third-tier 
 suppliers are starting to shut down. 
 - The capability to manufacture and integrate 
 specific long-lead items (e.g., the External Tank) 
 will very soon be too degraded to restore 
 efficiently, cost-effectively, and in a timely 
 manner.
 - Key personnel positions are slated for elimination 
 in the first half of 2009.
 - Supplier tiers and personnel skill mixes complicate 
 retention of necessary infrastructure.

•Continuing to fly the Shuttle requires reevaluation of crew and mission safety. Relatively high levels of inherent risk reside in the Shuttle design, and these risks rise as more flights are attempted. Indeed, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended recertification of the Space Shuttle at the material, component, subsystem, and system levels if it flies beyond 2010.

2
[[centered footer]] ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2008