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Memorandum                                        10 November 2008

To:   Adm. Joseph Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

CC:   Shana Dale, Deputy Administrator, NASA
      Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, NASA
      Paul Morrell, Chief of Staff, NASA

From: Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, NASA

Subject: ASAP Questions for NASA Transition


It is my understanding that the ASAP would like to meet with senior NASA officials to discuss agency transition issues prior to the presidential transition in January 2009. The questions below were offered as potential items for discussion. I believe these questions are good ones, and that they deserve a written response for the record. With this memo I am providing that response. I have asked those on the "CC" list to provide similar but independent responses to your panel, as I believe that the different viewpoints may be of assistance to you in your effort to help provide a smooth transition for the agency.


1) What do you view as prime progress?

The space shuttle was returned to flight with two planned tests involving considerably more difficulty than initially envisioned, but has flown well for nine operational ISS assembly and logistics missions since. The space shuttle program team is technically solid, starting at the very top of the Space Operations Mission Directorate.

In the category of "lessons learned", the difficulty of returning to flight was substantially aggravated by early decisions, principally in regard to the short planning horizon employed. We were always "X months from flight", where X was a varying number, but always too small to accommodate a strategic assessment of what needed to be done. As events progressed, we moved from one short-term "fix" to another for thirty months. I personally inserted a final three-month delay shortly after joining the agency, to accommodate what was in my judgment the necessary addition of heaters to the lox feedline bellows to prevent the formulation of especially hazardous ice debris. Yet, when STS-114 finally flew in July 2005, an unexpected loss of foam from the protuberance aerodynamic loads (PAL) ramp was experienced. Subsequent investigation revealed that the PAL ramp foam had undergone significant rework, that differing opinions existed as to its suitability for flight, and that none of these concerns had been discussed with senior management. Another year was spent reworking external tank (ET) foam loss issues before sufficient understanding was gained to allow STS-121 to be launched with confidence. (Part of the delay was due to hurricane Katrina, which greatly disrupted external tank production.) The STS-121 ET performed well, as have subsequent tanks, and especially those following the incorporation of a redesigned ice/frost ramp. The ability to dissect ET-120, not