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because of foam problems but because of problems with the LH2 low-level engine cutoff (ECO) sensors, proved to be extremely valuable. This was the first time that we were able to dissect the foam of a tank that been subjected to cryogenic loading. In addition to allowing us to resolve the ECO sensor problems we had experienced, the data obtained were the key to a better understanding of foam performance. Typically we not have done this type of test. We need to learn from this experience, and schedule invasive testing of this type as part of a development program. Progress continues to be made, but our understanding of ET debris shedding has undergone transformational improvement. 

ISS assembly continues with what can only be considered startling success. Modules and equipment continue to be placed on-orbit and integrated with the ISS with a near-zero level of problems, other than a few minor software incompatibilities. It is hard to identify any actions that should have been taken to ensure success that were not. Exceptions do exist; the starboard solar alpha rotating joint (SARJ) degraded with use because of a manufacturing error in applying gold coating - a lubricant - to the load bearing surfaces of the trundle bearings. A solar array tore while being extended, and another failed to extend because extension cables hung up on their guides But in the overall scheme of this enormous construction project, ISS assembly has been near perfect. I consider this directly attributable to present and prior ISS program management personnel at JSC: Suffredini, Gerstenmaier, Holloway, Greene, and numerous others. A lengthy string of the very highest quality people have helped to manage ISS, and it shows. 

In keeping with the requirements of presidential policy and Congressional authorization, a logical and disciplined approach to space shuttle retirement by the end of 2010, and transition to planned Constellation systems, has been developed and is being implemented. The architecture selected for Constellation makes maximum possible use of existing space shuttle assets, easing the transition to the extent we believe possible. Deployment dates for Constellation systems are and have been controlled primarily by budget considerations. In 2005, with adequate funding, it was possible to field Ares 1 and Orion in support of ISS by 2011-12, with confidence. Today, our commitment date for IOC is mid-FY 15. The lengthly gap between shuttle retirement and the availability of Constellation systems is one of my greatest concerns. During this interim, we will be dependent upon Russia for crew transport, and upon a combination and international (ESA, JAXA) and potential commercial providers for cargo delivery to sustain the ISS. 

The agency governance structure was returned to that which was in use during the Apollo program within the Office of Manned Space Flight; i.e., a "matrix" approach, in which Center Directors and Mission Directors report equally to a single entity, in this case the Associate Administrator. The NASA AA functions in the manner of a "Chief Operating Officer" in industry, balancing programmatic and institutional imperatives. This approach provides agency-wide "independent technical authority", as mandated by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), by allowing two independent chains of command (programmatic and institutional) from the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy to the highest. Much work remains to educate all employees in the use of this command structure, but (in my view) tremendous progress has also been made.