![Transcription Center logo](/themes/custom/tc_theme/assets/image/logo.png)
This transcription has been completed. Contact us with corrections.
3 [[circled]] 4 [[circled]] 57-C (Jan '85) launch T = 53 degrees erosion in 4 joints; 2 gases had blown past at primary, & gotten to secondary [[arrow up]] (O-RING HADN'T YET SEALED) IDENTIFIED AS PROBLEM (LINKED TO T) - "ACCEPT THE RISK" 5 [[circled]] NEXT FLIGHT ALSO HAD EROSION ; ([[?]]) PRIMARY O-RING DIDN'T SEAL (TOO MUCH EROSION) SECONDARY: EROSION [[arrow right]] MSFE placed a "launch constraint" on shuttle (!) ... THEN WAIVED IT FOR EVERY FLIGHT, INCLUDING ACCIDENT. (NASA PROGRAM MANAGERS DIDN'T KNOW THAT A LAUNCH CONSTRAINT HAD BEEN IMPOSED, THEN WAIVED) SUMMER [[arrow right]] '85 [[?]] engineer became concerned, wanted to do test, recognized T dependence [ [[?]] mgmt not supportive] [[left margin]] arrow right [[/left margin]] 1 [[circled]] RST PGM INADEQUATE 2 [[circled]] ACCEPTED ESCALATING RISK 3 [[circled]] SYSTEM FOR TRACKING ANOMALIES FAILED (NASA HAS FINALLY GOT DETAILED ENOUGH BRIEFING IN SUMMER) 4 [[circled]] NO T. HISTORY NO OCCURANCE [[double-facing arrow]] NO TREND ANALYSIS