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3 [[circled]]

4 [[circled]] 57-C (Jan '85)
launch T = 53 degrees
erosion in 4 joints; 2 gases had blown past at primary, & gotten to secondary 
[[arrow up]] 
(O-RING HADN'T YET SEALED)
IDENTIFIED AS PROBLEM (LINKED TO T) - "ACCEPT THE RISK"

5 [[circled]] NEXT FLIGHT ALSO HAD EROSION ; ([[?]])
PRIMARY O-RING DIDN'T SEAL (TOO MUCH EROSION)
SECONDARY: EROSION

[[arrow right]] MSFE placed a "launch constraint" on shuttle (!)

... THEN WAIVED IT FOR EVERY FLIGHT, INCLUDING ACCIDENT.
(NASA PROGRAM MANAGERS DIDN'T KNOW THAT A LAUNCH CONSTRAINT HAD BEEN IMPOSED, THEN WAIVED)

SUMMER [[arrow right]] '85 [[?]] engineer became concerned, wanted to do test, recognized T dependence [ [[?]] mgmt not supportive] 

[[left margin]] arrow right [[/left margin]]

1 [[circled]] RST PGM INADEQUATE
2 [[circled]] ACCEPTED ESCALATING RISK
3 [[circled]] SYSTEM FOR TRACKING ANOMALIES FAILED
(NASA HAS FINALLY GOT DETAILED ENOUGH BRIEFING IN SUMMER)
4 [[circled]] NO T. HISTORY NO OCCURANCE [[double-facing arrow]] NO TREND ANALYSIS