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Table 2

U.S. Tomahawk Procurements and Plans

[[3 column table]]

Type | Number procured (through FY 1989 | Total planned

Nuclear land-attack (TLAM/N) | 367 | 758

Conventional land-attack
Single warhead (TLAM/C) | 889 | 1,506
Submunitions (TLAM/D) | 181 | 1,173

Conventional ship-attack | 593 | 593
Total | 2,030 | 4,030

Source: U.S. Navy, Cruise Missile Project Office.

SS-N-21, believed to be deployed on only a few submarines. Table 1 lists the U.S. and soviet SLCMs currently deployed, and Table 2 shows the U.S. Tomahawk procurements and plans.
The United States currently has hundreds of long-range, land-attack SLCMs deployed as compared with at most a few tens for the Soviet Union. Further, those of the United States are deployed on a wide range of combat vessels, whereas the Soviet long-range SLCMs are confined to a few submarines. Clearly, any proposal that would limit only long-range, land-attack SLCMs would affect U.S. naval forces more than those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal currently on the table at START is a proposal of this type. It would limit both sides to 400 nuclear and 600 conventional long-range SLCMs. The effect of this proposal would be to limit both U.S. nuclear and conventional long-range SLCMs to approximately their current numbers--holding conventional SLCM's well below U.S. plans. The SS-N-21 would also be limited, but since there are now at most only a few tens of these and the proposed limit is 400, this limit would not be a constraint for some time. Soviet nuclear ship-attack SLCMs would not be affected, as their ranges are less than the proposed 600-kilometer limit.

In what follows we propose another specific arms control option: a ban on nuclear SLCMs of all ranges, with no constraint on conventional SLCMs. Over the period of implementation of the treaty, this would eliminate the SS-N-21 and all nuclear variants of the Soviet ship-attack SLCMs (possibly several hundred missiles), leaving the Soviets with short-range conventional anti-ship SLCMs and the freedom to develop a long-range conventional SLCM. The United States would give up the long-range nuclear variant of the Tomahawk (approximately 370 deployed missiles). The Harpoon and the anti-ship variant of the Toma-