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hawk would remain unconstrained, as would the long-range, land-attack conventional Tomahawk.

This option has several practical features that make it attractive:
1. Both sides would, over the course of the agreed period, have to eliminate a comparable number of currently deployed, nuclear-armed SLCMs.
2. Both sides would have a comparable number of surface ships and submarines subject to verification efforts. In particular, the ban on short-range nuclear SLCMs would require that Soviet surface ships be included.
3. Conventional weapons would not be limited under START.
4. The difficult problem of determining a SLCM's maximum operational range would be eliminated.
5. Verification of a treaty in which all nuclear SLCMs are banned need not compromise the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying that a given ship carries nuclear weapons.

It is widely believed that a verification regime limiting the production and deployment of SLCMs cannot be effective without being unacceptably intrusive. This is because it is commonly noted that SLCMs are small and easy to hide and can be produced in nondistinctive facilities, and the conventional and nuclear variants are difficult to distinguish. However, although a SLCM is small relative to an intercontinental ballistic missile, it is, nonetheless, a complex weapons system that requires a sophisticated industrial infrastructure for its production and maintenance. In addition, SLCMs are likely to be the largest objects that are loaded onto or stored on most platforms and cannot be readily, or safely, moved about or hidden on such ships. SLCMs on U.S. ships are found only in their launchers or in torpedo rooms and are not reloaded at sea. Further, conversion of a Tomahawk from conventional to nuclear, although technically feasible, would be a complex and time-consuming operation which, practically speaking, could be performed only at a factory. Considerations such as these, taken together, suggest that SLCM verification is not the intractable problem it is often presented to be, and that effective monitoring of SLCM deployments is possible without an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness.

The proposed verification regime would include the following key elements:
1. A comprehensive data exchange covering the numbers, types, and relevant design characteristic of SLCms already produced, as well as information about their launchers, platforms, and production and assembly facilities.