Viewing page 11 of 23

This transcription has been completed. Contact us with corrections.

2. Elimination of all nuclear SLCMs

3. Perimeter-portal monitoring of all declared facilities that assemble conventional SLCMs. SLCMs leaving these facilities would be monitored until they reached a special verification facility. (3)

4. A special verification facility where all legally produced SLCMs would be checked to verify that they did not carry nuclear warheads. This could be done with high confidence using active radiographic techniques. All missiles or their canisters would then be tagged for identification and sealed to permit detection of tampering. SLCMs returning from the field for maintenance or recertification would first go to this special verification facility for checking.

5. Inspections in ports of a sampling of deployed SLCMs to verify that only treaty-approved SLCMs were being deployed. This need not require inspectors on board ships or submarines, as will be explained.

6. A limited number of challenge inspections of both declared facilities and suspect sites to guard against covert production and deployment of nuclear SLCMs.

The role of a verification regime is to deter cheating by making it unacceptably difficult and costly, and to assure that military significant violations can be detected in time to be countered. The verification scheme that we have outlined accomplishes this at a level of intrusiveness that is consistent with that of other verification measures of START. The combination of perimeter-portal monitoring and tagging would identify all legal SLCMs; thus a covert production infrastructure would have to be established to manufacture illegal SLCMs. Furthermore, this covert infrastructure would have to tie into the nuclear infrastructure. Challenge inspections would help to deter the establishment of this infrastructure by increasing the risk of detection; verifying that only tagged SLCMs were flight-tested would further deter covert production by making it difficult to certify any covert production line. the inspection of deployed SLCMs would provide confidence that only conventional SLCMs were deployed and would deter covert deployment. (4)
_______

(3) If the special verification facility were close to the assembly facility, SLCMs could simply be followed between the two in order to insure that only legally produced SLCMs were certified for deployment. Otherwise, the shipping container for SLCMs could be tagged and sealed at the assembly facility.

(4) Challenge inspections could also be used to deter covert deployment on nonmilitary vessels