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required to correspond with the signature for a specific type of missile that had been established during a data exchange. 2) Tag the SLCM for later identification. The tag must be durable and tamper-proof, that is, nontransferable and nonreproducible. Technologies exist to make such tags and to make them unique, that is, to "fingerprint" each SLCM. One example of a tag, developed at Sandia National Laboratories, is a reflective particle paint consisting of a clear plastic material embedded with small particles of crystalline micaceous hematite. Such a tag involves three-dimensional, randomly generated patterns so that it cannot be reproduced. The tag is read by illuminating it with a sequence of lights at well-defined angles. The reflection patterns, which can be easily verified under field inspection conditions, as well as other features such as the shapes of individual particles in the tag, provide a unique fingerprint that is secure against counterfeiting (5). 3)Apply a seal that would reveal tampering with the missile upon subsequent inspection. A good seal, like a good tag, must be durable, nonreproducible and tamperproof, and therefore sealing the cruise missile in its canister may also simultaneously tag the missile for later identification. An interesting example of a seal is a mesh of optical fibers that would enclose the canister and would not impede launching of the missile. The seal is effected by locking the ends of fibers together in a device that cuts randomly some of these fibers. When the fibers are illuminated, a pattern is produced that can serve as a tag. Removing the cruise missile from the mesh or trying to break the lock would cut more of these optical fibers, changing the pattern (6). A Verification Regime The Verification of an arms control agreement relies on a collection of measures designed to ensure compliance with the agreement and to assure that militarily significant violations can be detected in time to be countered. A well-designed verification regime should not be vulnerable to circumvention without exposing the potential cheater to multiple risks of detection, and no single verification provision should be expected to carry the full burden of verification. The verification measures, together with national technical means and other sources of information, should combine to confront a potential cheater with multiple layers of obstacles which would have to be circumvented. An effective verification regime could be constructed from the following key elements: 1) A comprehensive data exchange covering the number, types, and relevant design characteristics of SLCMs already produced, as well as information about their launchers, platforms, and production and assembly facilities. A data exchange, once validated, would establish baseline conditions and support monitoring of the agreement. 2) Perimeter-portal monitoring of all declared facilities that assemble conventional SLCMs. Stations would be set up at exits on the perimeter of these facilities; then SLCMs leaving these facilities would be monitored until they reached a special verification facility. 3) A special verification facility. SLCMs leaving a declared production facility or SLCMs returning from the field for maintenance or recertification would first go to this special verification facility for checking. 4) Inspections of a sampling of deployed SLCMs. The purpose of these inspections would be to verify that only treaty-approved SLCMs were being deployed. Inspectors would select SLCMs from their launchers and then verify that they were properly tagged and that the seals were unbroken. This would be done in port and need not require inspectors on board SLCM platforms, as will be explained below. 5) A limited number of challenge inspections of both declared facilities and suspect sites. This would increase the risk of covert production and deployment of nuclear SLCMs. [[image]] [[caption]] Fig. 3. The SLCMs currently deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union, their ranges, and types of warheads. The dashed line indicates the Soviet's proposed definition of long-range. While both the United States and the Soviet Union have well over 1000 short-range, anti-ship missiles deployed, all those of the United States are conventional, whereas about 400 of the Soviet missiles are thought to be nuclear armed. The United States has deployed many long-range nuclear SLCMs, while the Soviets have deployed at most only a few. Clearly, any proposal that would limit only long-range SLCMs would affect U.S. naval forces more than those of the Soviet Union. [[image]] [[caption]] Fig. 4. The axial variation in transmissivity of 662-keV radiation from a cesium source for conventional and nuclear cruise missiles using a simulated (concrete) conventional warhead, a mock W84 nuclear warhead, and water to simulate fuel. From stations 54 to 90, the 662-keV transmissivity for the nuclear cruise missile is 20 to 40 times greater than for the conventional version. From stations 28 to 42, the conventional missile shows 30 to 50 times more transmissivity. Between stations 43 and 50, only the nuclear version completely absorbs the 662-keV radiation. [Data provided by D.C. Camp, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory] 10 NOVEMBER 1989 ARTICLES 767
