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have a pecuniary interest in NYA in that they expect to realize substantial amounts of incremental revenues from their investments in NYA; accordingly, it can be expected that even though they are now at odds over the extent of Pan American's control of NYA's operations at the Pan American heliport, there are other aspects of NYA's operation, which have been recited in some detail above, in which they have a common interest that they may act in concert in controlling that company's activities. The Board held under similar circumstances that Northeast Airlines was controlled by two railroads even though in the aggregate they owned only 30.4 percent of the carrier's stock. 39/ The Board held in still another case that control is not only dependent upon majority ownership of a company's stock but that control of a company may exist in some situations even though the controlling party owns no stock in the controlled company. 40/ It stated there that the term "control" is susceptible to a variety of meanings and that it implies the existence of a right or power in the controlling party to direct or dominate the affairs of a company, whether actually exercised or existing only in potential use. In a more recent case 41/ the Board stated --- "that control may be exercised in other ways than through a


39/ Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 CAB 379 (1943).

40/ Transcontinental and W.A., Control by Hughes Tool, 9 CAB 381, 386 (1948).

41/ Eastern-Colonial Control Case, 20 CAB 634, 635 (1955).

Transcription Notes:
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