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Two lower courts in the State of Florida have also recently taken a more relaxed view of what constitutes a taking. Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 95 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. Fla. 1964); Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, No. 139928, Div. G, Cir. Ct. 13th Cir., Hillsborough Cty, Fla., Jan 18,1966. Since two other recent lower court decisions in Florida require "substantial" interference the decision of that State's highest court is awaited with interest. Corbett v. City of Jacksonville, No. 63-2246-E, Div. J, Cir. Ct., 4th Cir., Duval Cty, Fla., Dec. 10,1965; Schumann v. City of Jacksonville, No. 63-4547-E, Div. E., Cir. Ct., 4th Cir., Duval Co., Florida, Jan. 26,1966. For a scholarly analysis that supports the more general view that "invasion and exclusionary possession of the airspace" over the land in question is a prerequisite to a "taking", see Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 Mich. Law Rev. 1373 (1965).

105. See 2 Nichols, Eminent. Domain § 6.1[3] (Rev. 3d Ed. 1963), which lists 25 states. Alaska also has such a provision.

106. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 8 Av. Cas. 18,324 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965).

2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed. 1950), at §§ 6.441-3, discusses the definition of "damage" under such provisions and concludes, with explanation as to the various courts' reasoning, that in most jurisdictions the definition used is narrower than simply "any public use of land which caused an actual ascertainable depreciation of the present market value of neighboring land." In the Martin case this

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