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THE ROAD TO CHUNGKING

It is difficult to believe that Japan seriously intends to attack China from Burma. Even on the assumption that it is wisest to finish off China before attempting the grand coup of planting the Japanese flag from Sydney to Bombay, it is difficult to see why Japan should attempt to do so the hardest way. Why cross the mountainous terrain of Yunnan and then advance up to Chungking instead of going by the shortest and most direct road along the Yangtze River from Hankow to Chungking? From the Burma border just to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, is 500 miles--500 miles of as hard going as any modern army could face. Most of it is traversible by the Burma Road alone; and the Burma Road, as the Chinese have found, is not easy to negotiate at the best. Against opposition it could be catastrophic.
The Chinese, who have first resorted to scorched-earth tactics, have already given proof of a magnificent disdain for the preservation of property when there were military purposes to gain by destruction. They are in a position to do what the Japanese have not been able to do--namely, destroy the Road. The Japanese would then have to fight their way through narrow, malarial passes, with the Chinese withdrawing slowly and infiltrating from behind, cutting their communications and ambushing unit by unit. And as the Japanese advanced they would be meeting the main body of the Chinese Army, not a hastily contrived expeditionary force such as they defeated in Burma. If the Japanese were ready and willing to throw half a million men into the campaign and to lose the larger part of them, they might succeed; but even if they were willing, they are not able to use so large a force for the purpose. With any less they will court disaster, a foretaste of which they had when they advanced on Changsha a few months ago and had at least two divisions cut to pieces. 
For the present it is safe to conclude that the Japanese are only staging a diversion. If there is anything more, it can be explained on one ground only, one that is outside the bounds of military and political logic. The Japanese military have always been tempted by the grandiose. They are prone to having their heads turned by success. After all the cautions imposed on them in the past by their own moderates, they have won astounding successes. They may have come to the conclusion that having the world by the throat, they might as well wring it now. Japan has overreached itself before. It may do so again.