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The New York Times Sunday February 8, 1942

JAPAN IS MAKING MOST OF LIMITED AIR STRENGTH

Surprise, Coordination, Bold Approach Are Factors--Our Problem Analyzed

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

In two months of war the wings of the plane have cast a long and ominous shadow across the Western Pacific.

Japanese air power, derided and underestimated before Dec. 7, last week began hammering at the citadel of Java in the Malay barrier, and shattered homes and flaming wreckage in Singapore's streets gave graphic evidence of the enemy's air superiority.

The Japanese operations against the Philippines, Hong Kong, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya and Burma have resulted in major successes for the enemy, first, because of Japanese superiority on the land, sea and in the air; second, because the Japanese attacks were swift and had the advantage of surprise; third, because they were very carefully coordinated in a skillful, predetermined plan and all Japanese forces operated as a unified machine.

But air superiority has been a principal factor in the enemy's success, and his grand strategical plan has been based upon the seizure of air bases and the exercise of air superiority over the theatre of action.

Limits to Foe's Strength

Contrary to the impressions that might be derived from a casual reading of the communiqués, Japanese air power is not illimitable. Wherever the enemy has struck, from the Bismarck Archipelago to Burma, he has had very considerable numerical superiority in the air, yet the total number of planes he has used in all these operations probably do not number more than several thousands.

The Japanese air force is not "unified"; that is the Army controls its over [[?]] and the Navy controls [[?]]. It is the Navy that [[?]] most of the long-ranged bombing missions [[?]] objectives, [[whil?]] air force is primarily concerned with the close support of ground troops and fighter protection for those troops.

The exact quantitative strength of the Japanese air arm is one of the major mysteries of [[?]] war.

Pre-war estimates puts that between 2,000 and [[6,000?]] military combat planes of all types. It now seems likely that the correct figure is closer to the higher [[?]] the 

many airfields, not only located at strategic points but widely dispersed so that planes may be protected when they are on the ground against enemy bombers. The Japanese were prepared with supplies and bases for the attacks they launched, and geography and distance favored them. Their strategy was geared to air bases.

Their landings--in the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies--have all been directed first against air bases; once an airfield was seized the Japanese then proceeded to establish new bases from which they could support their land drives. The bases seized were, moreover, nearly always located at a nexus of sea communications; with their planes the Japanese have supported subsequent landings and helped to control sea communications.

Value of Numbers

So far their attacks have been successful because their planes far outnumbered the enemy's and because the length of our sea communications, three to five times as long as the Japanese ling of communications, have prevented rapid reinforcement.

The air forces of the United Nations in the Far East were quite weak at the start of the war, those in Malaya and Singapore particularly so. The Netherlands Indies mustered a total of perhaps 500 to 700 planes. In Burma and China there was a small fighter group, totaling perhaps 100 P-40's. And Australia and New Zealand added Wirraways and some American Lockheeds and Catalinas to the total.

The grand total was certainly considerably less than the Japanese planes available, and the enemy, utilizing their control over sea communications and their extensive string of air bases, concentrated their planes at particular points of attack against widely dispersed forces of the United Nations. Lately, for instance, there have been few reports of much Japanese air activity against General Douglas MacArthur's forces in the Philippines.

Having destroyed most of the American air support in Luzon, it seems likely that some of the Japanese air forces once used in the Philippines have been shifted to

[[image: photo of the Pacific map and the Japanese lands.]]

AXIS INCITES TRIBES TO ATTACK INDIA "COLLABORATIONIST" FRENCH WON'T 'COLLAB

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