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- 54 - rate this job component as a critical one, considering the fact that this aspect of the job is not mentioned as contributing to unsafe airline flying and is not rated by many check-pilots as being one of the things they particularly look for which differentiate the good from the average airline pilot. Nevertheless, it is apparent that pilots are aware of the handicaps imposed upon them by poor cockpit design as shown in Table 22, page 41. The high frequency of "Forgot to Operate a Control" suggests a need for improvements in warning devices. The high frequency of "Confused Two Controls," "Made Improper Adjustment of a Control" and "Inadvertently Operated a Control" strongly suggests a need for improvement and standardization of cockpit design. The navigating and orienting component of the pilot's job proved to be critical, as determined from the analyses of critical incidents, the analysis of captains' unfavorable comments on eliminated pilots, from the high percentage of below-average ratings obtained by eliminated pilots on this aspect of their flying and from the frequency with which pilots report poor navigating as a cause of unsafe airline flying. It is apparent from pilots' comments, however, that they are operating with what they feel to be inadequate navigational aids, for they reported this inadequacy as being a cause of unsafe airline flying for frequently than any other unsafe condition. The above summary demonstrates how the information obtained in this survey can be integrated to point out critical requirements of the pilot's job. Other job components were found to be critical to a lesser extent than these three. The various tables indicate which these are. Data from the survey also indicate what specific pilot acts within each critical job component seem to be most critical. Actual observation of pilots performing these acts may be necessary to furnish clues as to what skills or psychological aptitudes are involved, to suggest refinements in evaluating pilots' performance of these acts, or to discover improved techniques of training pilots to perform these acts more efficiently. 2. Selection Requirements. Data obtained from company files and the subsequent comparison of the pre-employment data of eliminated pilots and successful pilots suggest that present requirements established by companies for selecting applicants may not be altogether adequate for predicting subsequent success or failure during training with any degree of confidence. This survey offered an opportunity for testing the effectiveness of many different requirements used by the various airlines, none of which seems to be sufficiently effective in doing the job for which they are intended. Although the data presented in this report do not offer a solution, they are pertinent to the more general problem of airline pilot selection. 3. Methods of Evaluations. Data obtained in this survey indicate that many of the most critical components of the pilot's job are not considered critical by the captains and Civil Aeronautics Administration Examiners who evaluate other pilots. There is some evidence that these check-pilots emphasize components of the job which seldom contribute to critical situations and accidents. This is understandable when it is remembered that airlines do want pilots with traits and abilities over and above those which insure safe flying. Data from this study can serve to point up critical components which perhaps are not being evaluated as effectively as some of the less critical components.
