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the reason that there must be a watchdog for air safety in air line transportation or this vital element will be sold short. 

This brings us with telling impact to the principal and elemental factor which so vitally affects air safety. It is the staling speed of our air line aircraft. Stalling speed is hinged and geared inseparably to safety. AT THIS JUNCTURE I WISH TO CALL THE COMMISSION'S PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO A LETTER MARKED ENCLOSURE NO. 1. It is a letter written on March 9, 1940, to Mr. Charles F. Dycer, Flight Engineering and Factory Inspection Division of the CAA. It relates to stalling speeds of air line aircraft and describes the terrific air safety battle that the air line pilots waged through the years of the late thirties and early forties, and are still waging, but thus far, it has proved to be a lasting fight. But, gentlemen of this Commission, when the air line pilots lose in an air safety flight, you can bet your bottom dollar air safety and public interest are taking a licking right along with the air line pilots. READ THE LETTER MARKED ENCLOSURE NO. 1. The air line pilots feel you will find it to be educational on the performance characteristics of air line aircraft and their most important related factors. It revolves around the all-important factor: a definite and fixed top stalling speed limit. The stalling speed of our civil air line aircraft is related inseparably and unmistakably to air safety. It is geared, in the same inseparable and unmistakable way, to our airport program, length of runways, and to their size general design, and construction characteristics. IN THIS LETTER (ENCLOSURE NO. 1), the air line pilots recommended in strong and determined language that air line aircraft have a top fixed stalling speed of 80 miles per hour. Their recommendations were adhered to, but only partially. In 1940, the stalling speed of air line aircraft raised by the Civil Aeronautics Board from 80 MPH to 85 MPH; and while this was high not was at least a fixed top stalling speed limit. 

Strangely enough, the story doesn't den there. We now refer you to an editorial (ENCLOSURE NO. 2) that appeared five years later in THE AIR LINE PILOT, the official publication of the air line pilots, in 1ts July, 1945 issue, which is based principally on a letter written to Mr. Charles F. Dycer, Flight Engineering and Factory Inspection Division of the CAA. This letter was dated August 2, 1945, five years and five months later than the first letter. This letter is a summation of the air line pilots' battle against a move that was initiated and sponsored in 1945 by the air carriers and the air line equipment manufacturers, with the cooperation of the CAB, namely aeronautical engineer and former CAB member Edward P. Warner, to squeeze a few more pounds of payload onto air line aircraft at the expense of safety. The voice of the air line pilots is strong, but the voice of payload dollars -- many dollars -- is stronger. And the air line pilots lost their battle to establish a top foxed limit on stalling speed for air line aircraft's and air safety took its worst beating in the history of air line transportation. READ ENCLOSURE NO. 2 CAREFULLY. IT IS VERY ILLUMINATING AND RECOUNTS THE STORY CAREFULLY AND COMPLETELY.