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further suggested that the Company is attempting to trade on our gullibility and capitalize on our new spirit of cooperation. He suggested that the MEC not dignify this by any further action. The Company in negotiations "could not capitalize the 81 hour pay cap" any earlier than July 1970, now suddenly they can do it. He conceded that somebody looks like a liar.

Crane added that the Company might not implement the January Section 28 bid on time if they don't get the requested relief now. Cusack agreed with Crane and stated that a poll of the Boston pilots indicated that they were in favor of the proposed pay cap by a margin of two to one.

Railsback stated that the Company, in upping the proposal from 90 to 95 hours, has raised the price to the point where a one-month roll back of the 81 hour cap is not sufficient. The MEC would be selling the pilots too cheaply, once again, if they went along with it. 

Railsback then introduced Captain Bill Frey from the Miami council, who has done a great deal of research on time reduction application and manpower utilization. He produced figures showing that with the new working agreement, EAL pilots are working for $4.50 less per hour than American or TWA pilots in the same categoriess, not to mention that the 13.34% of EAL pilots should be promoted and weren't, for the same reasons - the fact that these other companies have four year jet Captains. He pointed out that TWA and American's contracts are almost identical and that they are the industry trend setters. He further pointed out that our Negotiating Committee at one point offered to take American's contract all the way, including their duty rigs, and the Company flatly refused. In the final analysis, our contract isn't nearly as good. Frey recommended first, a flat unqualified refusal or, second, a drop from 81 hours right down to 75 hours. 

Malone repeated Corkran's original question. "Does an emergency really exist?" He added that if training is the cause of the Company's so-called emergency, the MEC answer should be a definite "No." He cited the history of the Company always calling for more time from the pilots and then certain Company people "sharp penciling" the contract to get even more time. He felt that the first consideration should be whether or not an emergency does or does not exist. 

Railsback stated that the general feeling in Miami is against giving the Company any more time. He further pointed out that the MEC works for the pilots. The issue breaks down to whether or not the MEC wants to do the Company a favor and/or whether  something should be expected in return for the additional services.

Crane asked Tully why the Company raised their request from 90 to 95 hours. Tully answered that the reason given to him was that the pilots were not volunteering in large enough numbers to suit the Company's needs. 

Corkran stated that Mr. Higginbottom said the problem to a large degree lies in the EAL philosophy of scheduling, i.e., saturation scheduling. The problem as stated by Corkran is the Company's. Let them solve it. Scott felt that to accept the proposal was establishing a bad precedent. Corkran then said that the Company has caused a deterioration of the value of working agreements to the point where contracts are not worth the paper are written on. This is due to sharp-shooting by Management and a grievance machinery that is a farce. The MEC is not charged with solving the Company's problems.