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72 that it is not even valid for what it purports to be, and that as a passport it bears on its face the insignia of imposture. But at present I will only observe that it is a most unheard-of thing, that in a question of property, a passport should be supposed to give a valid title. Papers of foreign courts and functionaries are to be credited for that which they intend to do. A passport, if it is regular, is to be credited as a passport. But when was it ever supposed that a passport stating what a person carries with him is evidence of his property in that which is described? All the decisions of this court agree that foreign papers are good only for that which they propose and purport, but not as evidence of property. And yet the opinion of the late Attorney-General rests on that ground. In a case involving the lives and liberties of a large number of men, he has not a word to say of the principles of justice or humanity concerned, but goes entirely on the force of this document, on the ground that we cannot go behind the certificate of the Spanish Captain General. He says: "Were this otherwise, all confidence and comity would cease to exist among nations; and that code of international law, which now contributes so much to the peace, prosperity, and harmony of the world, would not longer regulate and control the conduct of nations." This principle of national comity, I have no desire to contest, so far as it is applicable to this case. The Attorney says:— "In the case of the Antelope, (10 Wheaton, page 66,) this subject was fully examined, and the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes the following points:— "1. That, however unjust and unnatural the slave trade may be, it is not contrary to the law of nations. "2. That, having been sanctioned by the usage and consent of almost all civilized nations, it could not be pronounced illegal, except so far as each nation may have made it so by its own acts or laws; and these could only operate upon itself, its own subjects or citizens; and, of course, the trade would remain lawful to those whose Government had not forbidden it. "3. That the right of bringing in and adjudicating upon the case of a vessel charged with being engaged in the slave trade, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot exist. The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another, and the course of the American Government 73 on the subject of visitation and search would decide any case in which that right had been executed by an American cruiser, on the vessel of a foreign nation not violating our municipal laws, against the captors. "It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade, captured on the high seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in for adjudication, would be restored. "The opinions here expressed go far beyond the present case; they embrace cases where the negroes never have been within the territorial limits of the nation of which the claimant is a citizen." Here reference is made to the case of the Antelope, in 10 Wheaton, to which I shall hereafter solicit the particular attention of the Court, as I purpose to examine it in great detail, as to all the principles that have been supposed to be decided by that case, and especially on the point here alluded to, concerning which Chief Justice Marshall says that the Court was divided, therefore no principle is decided. That was the most solemn and awful decision that ever was given by any Court. The Judges did not deliver their opinions for publication, or the reasons, because the court was divided. this case is laid at the foundation of the argument or opinion of the Attorney-General on which this whole proceeding is based, and it appealed to in all the discussions as authority against the rights of these unfortunate people. I shall, therefore, feel it to be my duty to examine it to the bottom. The second principle drawn by the late Attorney General, if he had reasoned on the subject as men ought to reason, is in favor of the claims of the Africans.. The Antelope was engaged in the slave trade south of the Line, where it was not then prohibited by the laws of Spain. The decision of the Supreme Court, such as it was was in affirmance of the decree of the court below. Judge Davies, in the District Court of Georgia, and Judge Johnson , of the Circuit Court, said that, if the slave trade had at that time been abolished by Spain, the decision would have been otherwise. That trade is now abolished by Spain. The late Attorney General says "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." I may ask, does any nation execute the slave laws of another country? Is not the slave system, the Code Noir, as peculiar as the revenue system or the criminal code? These men were found free, and they cannot now be decreed to be slaves, but by making them slaves. By 10