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homing instinct only resulted in suicide.  Many fishes and shellfishes that bred in restricted areas along the coasts followed them as onshore pollution escalated.

By 1977 the annual yield of fish from the sea was down to 30 million metric tons, less than one-half the per capita catch of a decade earlier. This helped malnutrition to escalate sharply in a world where an estimated 50 million people per year were already dying of starvation.  The United Nations attempted to get all chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides banned on a worldwide basis, but the move was defeated by the United States.  This opposition was generated primarily by the American Petrochemical industry, operating hand in glove with its subsidiary, the United States Department of Agriculture.  Together they persuaded the government to oppose the U.N. move-- which was not difficult since most Americans believed that Russia and China were more in need of fish products than was the United States.  The United Nations also attempted to get fishing nations to adopt strict and enforced catch limits to preserve dwindling stocks.  This move was blocked by Russia, who, with the most modern electronic equipment, was in the best position to glean what was left in the sea. It was, curiously, on the very day in 1977 when the Soviet Union announced its refusal that another ominous article appeared in Science.  It announced that incident solar radiation had been so reduced by worldwide air pollution that serious effects on the world's vegetation could be expected. 

II.

Apparently it was a combination of ecosystem destabilization, sunlight reduction, and a rapid escalation in chlorinated hydrocarbon pollution from massive Thanodrin applications which triggered the ultimate catastrophe.  Seventeen huge Soviet-financed Thanodrin plants were operating in underdeveloped countries by 1978.  They had been part of a massive Russian "aid offensive" designed to fill the gap caused by the collapse of America's ballyhooed "Green Revolution".

It became apparent in the early '70s that the "Green Revolution" was more talk than substance.  Distribution of high yield "miracle" grain seeds had caused temporary local spurts in agricultural production.  Simultaneously, excellent weather had produced record harvests.  The combination permitted bureaucrats, especially in the United States Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development (AID), to reverse their previous pessimism and indulge in an outburst of optimistic propaganda about staving off famine.  They raved about the approaching transformation of agriculture in the underdeveloped countries (UDCs).  The reason for the propaganda reversal was never made clear.  Most historians agree that a combination of utter ignorance of ecology, a desire to justify past errors, and pressure from agro-industry (which was eager to sell

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