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the limits of Academy-oriented definitions, partly because the essence of art will be forever indefinable and partly because of certain restrictive interpretations, not only are certain works of art dutiable--thus violating the intent of the law--but a series of strange and fantastic situations occur. This is the saga of that small, little-known corner of the law.

Some of the most curious and arbitrary decisions arise in the field of sculpture. The law, as a matter of fact, is very definite about what constitutes sculpture. In the first place, the object must be by a "professional." The differentiation between "professional" and "amateur" stumps many a critic in these days of amateuritis, but the law quite simply cuts the Gordion knot by means of a mimeographed questionaire whereby it is determined that a "professional" is one who has attended schools or academies, produced statuary for sale, exhibited in museums and, desirably, received awards of merit.

No need to flounder wither in distinguishing between artisan and sculptor. According to/a Treasury Decision, "one copies and the other, in a sense, creates and originates." Volumes have been written about whether an object made for everyday use can be a work of art and curators in museums rest comfortably secure in the belief that a Greek drinking vase or a medieval vessel used to pour water for hand-washing deserve their eminent glass-encased statuses. But Uncle Sam is adamant: no modern "article of utility" can be a sculpture.

Yet, so far, so good. It would seem that the Tariff paragraph is liberal enough to admit any sculpture as a work of art if it is done by a professional and is not a utilitarian object. But the situation is not so simple. For the customs examiners must follow a Treasury Decision of 1916 --