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and other papers was delivered by Parkhurst on his death-bed to the plaintiff.
Admitting this to be proved, and that the delivery of the key was a sufficient delivery of the contents of the box, then the gift must have passed title to the entire property.
Statements of the deceased made at the time [[Strikethrough]] at a time [[/Strikethrough]] distinct from this transaction, and to the effect that part of the bonds were for his sister, cannot be regarded as affecting the transaction itself, or in any way limiting the gift.  If made at all it was made unqualifiedly,  The statement of Parkhurst might have placed the plaintiff under a moral obligation to comply with them, after receiving the gift, but her legal title to the property could not be qualified by requests or wishes entirely disconnected with the act by which she gained title, and in no way qualifying it. If, then, a gift was proved, the decree of the court should have given its entire value to the plaintiff instead of less than one-fourth, which it awarded to her.
If the plaintiff's claim is regarded as a debt due her from the deceased, the decree of the court is manifestly inadequate.
Admitting that evidence to prove such a claim was admissible under the pleadings in this case, and that it was clearly proven, the decree should have given the full amount of the debt at least, which is fixed as a definite sum, but the amount awarded is nearly five hundred dollars less than the claim.
Nothing to account for the reduction appears in the evidence submitted, and no reason for it is given in the decree.
If, as seems most probable from the evidence, the plaintiff gave Parkhurst money to invest for her in bonds, then the decree should award an amount in money equal to that given for the investment, or in bonds whose face represents such an amount.

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neither of which is done.
Granting, therefore, that the plaintiff has proved a claim, the decree is unjust, regarded in the light of her interest only, upon whatever ground her claim rests.
It is needless to show its injustice to the defendants, whose right to complain is still stronger than that of the plaintiff.
The decree is utterly unjustifiable and inequitable, and disregards the most elementary principles of law, in whatever light it is viewed.
An appeal was taken from the decision of the court, and the papers were referred to a special commission for investigation.
This commission finds that Parkhurst, the deceased, was indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of one thousand five hundred and sixty dollars ($1560.) and hold his administrator and Maury & Co. jointly and severally responsible for the amount. Maury & Co being, according to the Commission, unauthorized to delivery the box of bonds to the administrator
Now the issue in this case, as made by the pleadings, is simply as to the title of Rhoda Christian to certain bonds.
Her complaint or petition is inconsistent with a claim for debt, and no semblance of such a claim is set up in it.
This petition was not amended at any stage of the case.  It was therefore improper to admit evidence on such an issue, or to make a judgment upon it.
Granting, however, that such evidence was proper, then the opinion of the commission is improper, in that it holds Maury & Co responsible for delivering the box of bonds to Hughes a duly authorized administrator.
A claim against these bonds in the nature of a debt admits the propriety of their passing as assets into the hands of the administrator, in order that he may satisfy claims again the estate which he represents, and, of course, admits the propriety of the action taken by 

Transcription Notes:
---------- Reopened for Editing 2024-04-06 10:40:39