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Pacific Strategy - II Giant Growth of American Navy Makes Possible an Early Pacific Offensive By Hanson W. Baldwin Two years ago, the Japanese aircraft production of all types of military planes, including trainers, was probably between 400 and 800 planes a month, possibly closer to the higher figure. Today, it may be between 800 and 1,200 planes a month, possibly closer to the higher figure. Two years ago Japan has a merchant ship construction capacity of about 400,000 to 500,000 tons per year. Today she has lost perhaps 2,500,000 tons in the war, but her replacement capacity has increased (though it is probably inadequate to meet losses) to 800,000 to 900,000 tons annually. Two years ago, during all of 1941, the United States produced 1,088,000 tons of merchant shipping; this year of 1943, we shall produce at least 19,000,000 dead-weight tons. Two years ago, the Pacific fleet of the United States Navy - though it represented the major part of our naval strength - was inferior in numbers to the Japanese fleet. Two years ago we had in both oceans some seven regular aircraft carriers; the Japanese had at least nine, plus more converted auxiliary carriers than we had. Japan's Naval Strength Today Today, the Japanese naval strength, allowing for all losses and new construction, is about as follows: Battleships - ten, including two new 16-inch gun ships, probably names the Yamoto and Musashi, completed since the war began. One more battleship may be almost completed. Carriers - seven or eight, plus three or four converted auxiliary carriers. Cruisers - thirty to thirty-five (heavy and light). Destroyers - about seventy-five, exclusive of torpedo boats. Submarines - eighty-odd, exclusive of the midget type. Japan's most serious shortage is not in cruisers, as many erroneous claims of cruiser sinkings might lead one to believe, but in destroyers - and compared with our increasing strength in plane-bearing craft - in carriers. Probably some of Japan's new cruisers and possibly some of her new battleships are being converted to carriers, but our carriers are being turned out at a far faster rate. As compared with the Japanese fleet, the American naval strength today (in all oceans) is probably, by conservative estimates, about as follows: Battleships - Twenty-one, including eight new 16-inch-gun ships. Carriers - Twelve to fifteen, plus dozens of escort and auxiliary carriers and plane transport vessels. Cruisers - Fifty to sixty (heavy and light). Destroyers - Three hundred to three hundred and twenty, exclusive of torpedo boats. Submarines - one hundred and sixty-five to one hundred and ninety-five. Our Major Power in the Pacific Of course, this gigantic American Navy, which has not yet, by any means, reached its full growth, is spread over many oceans. It is nevertheless safe to assume that a major part of our naval strength - particularly carrier and battleship strength - is in the Pacific. And these calculations do not include Allied naval and air strength available now (with more becoming available later) for use against Japan. These comparative figures (which take no account of damaged ships) are a sufficient indication of how we have profited by time in the Pacific. We are steadily growing stronger with each passing month. Barring a naval or air defeat more serious than Pearl Harbor, that progress should be continuous and uninterrupted. In other words, a year from now our naval and air superiority, vis-à-vis Japan, should have increased even more remarkably than it has done in the past two years. These facts are the reasons behind our ability - which most observers think it will be demonstrated in the next six months - to start a major offensive in the Pacific without waiting for the end of the European war.
